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ABSTRACT
An analysis was performed of the safety-related
performance of the reactor protection system (RPS) at
U.S. Westinghouse commercial reactors during the period
1984 through 1995.  RPS operational data were collected
from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System and
Licensee Event Reports.  A risk-based analysis was
performed on the data to estimate the observed
unavailability of the RPS, based on a fault tree model of
the system.  Results were compared with existing
unavailability estimates from Individual Plant
Examinations and other reports.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Operational experience of the U.S. Westinghouse
RPS from 1984 through 1995 was studied and
documented in the report Reliability Study:  Westinghouse
Reactor Protection System, 1984 - 1995. 1  The analysis
focused on the ability of the RPS to automatically shut
down the reactor given a plant upset condition requiring a
reactor trip while the plant is at full power.  RPS spurious
reactor trips or component failures not affecting the
automatic shutdown function were not considered.
Systems added as part of the anticipated transient without
scram (ATWS) mitigation effort were not included in the
analysis.
The Westinghouse RPS is a complex control system
comprising numerous electronic components that
combine to provide the ability to produce an automatic or
manual rapid shutdown of the nuclear reactor, known as a
reactor trip or scram.  In spite of its complexity, the
Westinghouse RPS can be roughly divided into four
segments – instrumentation rack (channels), logic cabinet
(trains), trip breakers, and rods – as shown in Figure 1.
The rods segment includes the rod control cluster
assemblies (RCCAs) and associated control rod drive
mechanisms (CRDMs).  Westinghouse RPSs typically
have 40 to 60 RCCAs and associated CRDMs.  The trip
breaker segment includes the reactor trip breakers and
associated undervoltage and shunt trip devices.  For the
logic cabinet (trains), approximately 70% of the RPSs
have solid-state logic termed the Solid State Protection
System (SSPS), while the remaining 30% have analog
logic.  Finally, for the instrumentation rack (channels)
approximately 85% of the RPSs have analog systems to
process the signals, while the remaining 15% have
converted to the Eagle-21 solid state system.
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Figure 1.  Segments of Westinghouse RPS.
The analysis of the Westinghouse RPS was based on
a four-loop plant with either an Eagle-21 or Analog Series
7300 sensor processing system and an SSPS for the logic
cabinet.  This configuration is representative of many
plant designs.  The Westinghouse RPS includes many
different types of trip signals.  The trip signals include
various neutron flux indications, pressurizer pressure and
level, reactor coolant flow, steam generator level, and
others.  For most types of plant upset conditions, at least
three different trip signals would be generated.  For this
study, only two of the trip signals were modeled:
overpower ∆T and pressurizer high pressure.
There are two RPS trains in the logic cabinet, trains
A and B.  These trains receive trip signals from the
channels, process the signals, and then open the reactor
trip breakers given appropriate combinations of signals
from the channels.  For the RPS to fail, both of the trains
(or their associated reactor trip breaker) must fail, a
sufficient number of channel failures must occur, or a
sufficient number of RCCAs must fail to insert.  Since
only two diverse trip signals were modeled, 3 of 4
channels for each of the two trip signals must fail.  It was
assumed that 10 or more of the 40 to 60 RCCAs must fail
to fully insert (in a random pattern).  A sensitivity study
was conducted to determine the impact on RPS
unavailability from this assumption.
Testing of the Westinghouse RPS can be summarized
by RPS segment (Figure 1).  Generally, the RPS channels
are tested every three months, with the channel being
placed in a bypass condition during the test.  The trains
and reactor trip breakers are tested on a staggered
monthly basis.  This means that each train (and associated
breaker) is tested every two months.  Finally, the RCCAs
and associated CRDMs are tested every refueling or 18
months.
II.  SYSTEM FAULT TREE
System fault trees were constructed for each of the
two Westinghouse RPS designs analyzed:  Analog Series
7300 and Eagle-21.  The level of detail in the fault tree
includes RCCA/CRDMs, reactor trip breakers and bypass
trip breakers (broken down into mechanical/electrical,
undervoltage device, and shunt trip device contributions),
undervoltage driver and universal cards in the SSPS,
selected relays, temperature and pressure
sensor/transmitters, Eagle-21 and analog process logic
modules, and bistables.  As noted previously, two trip
signals were included in the fault tree, even though at
least three signals are typically generated for plant upset
conditions.  A sensitivity study was conducted to
determine the impact on RPS unavailability if three trip
signals had been modeled.
Common-cause failures (CCFs) across similar
components were explicitly modeled in the RPS fault tree.
In general, CCF events were defined to involve sufficient
failures of the component type to fail the RPS.  Lower-
order CCF events, which must be combined with random
component failures to cause an RPS failure, were not
included in the fault tree.  Results of the fault tree
quantification were reviewed to ensure that the exclusion
of lower-order CCF events did not significantly impact
the results.
Test and maintenance outages and associated RPS
configurations were modeled for the SSPS (and
associated reactor trip breaker) and channel outages.  For
channel outages, the channel was assumed to be placed
into a bypass condition, rather than a tripped mode.  For
SSPS train outages, only the other train is available to
respond to plant upset conditions.
The Analog Series 7300 RPS fault tree model
included approximately 120 basic events, of which
approximately 40 were CCF events.  Approximately
25,000 cut sets were generated when the fault tree model
was solved using the SAPHIRE computer code. 2  The
Eagle-21 fault tree model had a similar level of
complexity.
III.  DATA REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Westinghouse RPS performance during the
period 1984 through 1995 was assessed by reviewing
Licensee Event Reports and the Nuclear Plant Reliability
Data System reports.  Fifty-three U.S. Westinghouse
nuclear power plants were covered in the study.
Approximately 15,000 reports were identified.  Of these
15,000, approximately 1,000 involved actual component
failures (independent or CCF) applicable to this study.
The data review process involved at least two
independent reviews of each event report by
knowledgeable engineers.  Each event was characterized
by safety function impact (fail-safe, non-fail-safe, or
unknown) and degree of failure (complete failure, no
failure, or unknown).  This resulted in a three-by-three
matrix, with nine different bins into which an event could
be placed, as indicated in Figure 2.  This classification
scheme resulted in one bin with non-fail-safe, complete
failures of components.  Three other bins may also
contain such events, but limited information from the
event report did not allow the analysts to determine
whether the events were non-fail-safe, complete failures.
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a.  Events in this bin receive weights of 1.0.
b.  Events in these bins receive weights of <1.0.
c.  Events in these bins are not applicable.
Figure 2.  Data classification scheme.
The data analysis considered events from these four bins
(shaded bins in Figure 2), using a weighting scheme to
account for the uncertainty in the unknown events.
Data analysis for the component failures involved
several steps:
1. Demand count and exposure time estimation
2. Statistical analysis of data subgroups to identify
differences
3. Component unavailability estimation
4. CCF event unavailability estimation
5. Trending with time evaluation.
The component demand counts were estimated from plant
scram histories (for those components demanded by a
scram), and testing intervals (generally staggered
monthly, every three months, or every 18 months).
Statistical analysis of data subgroups was performed
to identify differences in component performance
resulting from plant mode (at power or shutdown), time
period (1984 – 1989 versus 1990 – 1995), or type of
demand (scram or test).  The data from the selected data
subgroup were then analyzed to determine component
failure probabilities or rates.
Results of the data analysis to determine component
failure probabilities or rates are presented in Figure 3.
The numbers of component failures listed in Figure 3 are
generally subsets of the total number of failures identified
in the data review.  For example, if the data subgroup
analysis indicated a significant difference in component
performance between 1984 – 1989 and 1990 – 1995, then
only the 1990 – 1995 data were used.  In general, the
resultant component failure probabilities and rates are
comparable with existing estimates. 3 through 6
Quantification of the CCF events in the fault tree was
performed using the alpha factor method outlined in the
report Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis
System:  Event Definition and Classification. 7  Only CCF
events associated with the Westinghouse RPS during the
period 1984 through 1995 were used in the quantification
process.  Several steps were required in the overall CCF
evaluation:
1. Characterization of CCF data (component group size,
impact vector, shared cause and timing factors, and
failure completeness factor)
2. Characterization of CCF events modeled in the fault
trees (component group size and required number of
component failures)
3. Development of alpha factor equations for each of
the CCF events modeled
4. Development of an appropriate prior for the alpha
factors
5. Mapping up or down of CCF data to match the
component group sizes modeled in the fault trees
6. Quantification of CCF event probabilities using
component-specific CCF data and the prior.
Selected results of the CCF event quantification
process are presented in Figure 4.  In general, the CCF
event probabilities reflect multipliers (from the alpha
factor equations) of 0.002 to 0.08 on the component
failure probabilities.  These multipliers are influenced by
the specific failure criterion (minimum number of
component failures required and size of component
group), strength of the component-specific CCF data, and
the prior distribution for the alpha factors obtained from
the Westinghouse CCF data.  In general, there were very
few complete CCF events (where all the components in
the group fail due to a common cause).  Also, there were
no complete CCF events in the higher-order group sizes.
Trending analysis over time was performed for the
component failure probabilities and the number of CCF
events.  Four of 14 component types exhibited decreasing
trends over time with respect to failure probabilities.  The
remaining 10 component types did not exhibit any
significant trends.  Therefore, none of the component
types exhibited increasing failure probabilities over time.
The number of CCF events reported each year
dropped significantly over the period 1984 – 1995.  This
is the result of three component types exhibiting
decreasing trends over time.  The remaining 11 exhibited
no trends.  Therefore, none of the component types
exhibited increasing numbers of CCF events over time.
Most of the component trends (or lack of trends) were
supported by a limited number of CCF events.
IV.  RESULTS
The Westinghouse RPS fault trees were quantified
using the basic event failure probabilities presented in
Figures 3 and 4.  The resultant RPS mean unavailability
(failure probability upon demand) is 2.2E-5, assuming no
credit for operator action.  This result is for a four-loop
plant with Analog Series 7300 channel processing and
SSPS trains.  If credit is taken for the operator to actuate
the manual scram switch, then the mean unavailability
drops to 5.4E-6.  Dominant failures involve CCFs of the
undervoltage driver cards, channel bistables, channel
signal processing modules, SSPS universal cards, reactor
trip breakers, and RCCA/CRDMs.  Overall, CCF events
contribute 95% to the RPS unavailability.
Quantification of the Eagle-21 fault tree resulted in
an RPS mean unavailability of 2.0E-5.  This drops to
Component Type Number
of
Failures a
Number of
Demands or
Hours
Failure
Probability or
Rate b
Basic Event Description
Reactor trip breaker
(mechanical/electrical)
0
(0.0)
13546 3.7E-5 Trip breaker failure to open (mechanical/
electrical failure that defeats both undervoltage
and shunt trip devices)
Reactor trip breaker
(shunt trip device)
8
(7.5)
13048 5.8E-4 Shunt trip failure to energize and open the
reactor trip breaker
Reactor trip breaker
(undervoltage coil
device)
2
(2.0)
9856 2.5E-4 Undervoltage coil failure to de-energize and
open the reactor trip breaker
Eagle-21 channel
processor
11
(10.6)
972577 h 8.2E-6/h Eagle-21 channel processor fails to process
reactor trip signals and send appropriate outputs
to channel
Channel bistable 44
(40.0)
56235 7.4E-4 Channel bistable fails to trip at its setpoint and
actuate its train relays
Channel pressure
processing module
14
(5.6)
38115 1.6E-4 Channel pressure processing module (Analog
Series 7300) fails to process a reactor trip
signal and send appropriate output to the
channel bistable
Channel ∆T
processing module
36
(15.1)
3157 4.8E-3 Channel ∆T processing module (Analog Series
7300) fails to process a reactor trip signal and
send appropriate output the channel bistable
Channel pressure
sensor/transmitter
3
(0.2)
5832 1.2E-4 Channel pressure sensor/transmitter fails to
detect a high pressure and send appropriate
output to the channel processing module
Channel temperature
sensor/transmitter
11
(8.2)
14423 6.0E-4 Channel temperature sensor/transmitter fails to
detect a high/low temperature and send
appropriate output to the channel processing
module
RCCA and CRDM
(combined)
2
(1.0)
102088 1.5E-5 Failure of RCCA/CRDM, resulting in failure of
RCCA to insert into the reactor core
SSPS universal card 24
(23.0)
58220 3.8E-5 SSPS universal card fails to recognize a reactor
trip combination and send appropriate output to
the train undervoltage driver card
Channel bistable
relay; train
undervoltage driver
card relay
7
(6.2)
168686 3.9E-5 Relay associated with channel bistable fails to
respond to bistable trip; undervoltage driver
card shunt trip relay fails to respond
SSPS undervoltage
driver card
2
(2.0)
7424 3.4E-4 SSPS undervoltage driver card fails to respond
to a universal card reactor trip signal
a.  Includes uncertain events and CCF events.  The number in parentheses is the weighted average number of failures,
resulting from the inclusion of uncertain events in Figure 2 (shaded bins).
b.  The failure probability or rate calculation involves a complex simulation process to account for potential non-fail-safe,
complete failure events (the three bins in Figure 2 with the “b” footnote).  However, the probability can be approximated by
the expression (n+0.5)/(D+1), where n is the weighted number of failures (in parentheses in column 2) and D is the number
of demands.  The failure rate can be approximated by the expression (n+0.5)/T, where T is the time in hours.
Figure 3.  Westinghouse RPS component failure probabilities.
Component Type Number
of CCF
Events
Component
Failure
Probability
CCF Event
Probability
CCF Event Description
Reactor trip breaker
(mechanical/electrical)
1 3.7E-5 1.6E-6 CCF of 2 of 2 trip breakers (mechanical/electrical
failures)
Eagle-21 channel
processor
2 6.5E-5 a 5.1E-7 a CCF of 3 or more of 4 Eagle-21 channel modules
Channel bistable 43 7.4E-4 2.7E-6 CCF of 6 or more of 8 channel bistables
Channel pressure
processing module
2 1.6E-4 4.5E-6 CCF of 3 or more of 4 pressurizer high pressure
processing modules
Channel ∆T
processing module
51 4.8E-3 5.6E-5 CCF of 3 or more of 4 overtemperature ∆T processing
modules
Both types of
processing modules
5 7.8E-4 1.8E-6 CCF of 3 or more of 4 pressurizer high pressure
processing modules and 3 or more of 4 overtemperature
∆T processing modules
Channel pressure
sensor/transmitter
29 1.2E-4 2.1E-6 CCF of 3 or more of 4 pressurizer pressure
sensor/transmitters
Channel temperature
sensor/transmitter
29 6.0E-4 3.7E-5 CCF of 1 or more of 2 reactor coolant temperature
sensor/transmitters in 3 or more of 4 loops
RCCA/CRDM 2 1.5E-5 1.2E-6 CCF of 10 or more of 50 RCCA/CRDMs
SSPS universal card 6 3.8E-5 2.1E-6 CCF of 4 of 4 (pressurizer high pressure and ∆T)
universal cards in both trains
Channel bistable relay 8 3.9E-5 8.1E-8 CCF of 3 or more of 4 relays for 4 of 4 trip signals
Undervoltage driver
card relay
8 3.9E-5 2.0E-6 CCF of 2 of 2 shunt trip relays
SSPS undervoltage
driver card
0 b 3.4E-4 1.0E-5 CCF of 2 of 2 undervoltage driver cards
a.  The rates have been multiplied by a repair time of 8 hours to obtain an unavailability.
b.  A 1989 CCF event involving both cards was not used in the quantification.  Both card failures were caused by
maintenance activities while the plant was shut down, and the failures were detected before the plant returned to power.
Figure 4.  Selected Westinghouse RPS CCF event probabilities.
4.5E-6 if credit is taken for the operator to actuate the
manual scram switch.  Dominant failures for this design
are similar to those listed for the Analog Series 7300
design.  CCF events contribute 94% to the RPS
unavailability.
The Westinghouse RPS unavailability results can be
broken down into contributions by each of the four
segments.  These breakdowns are presented in Figure 5
for the Analog Series 7300 design.  Train failures
dominate, contributing 63.0% to the total.  However, this
drops to only 2.4% of the total if credit is taken for
manual scram by the operator.  This significant drop
occurs because the manual scram signal bypasses the train
undervoltage driver cards (CCF of these two cards
dominates the train unavailability).  The trip breaker
failure contribution is only 7.6% (29.1% with credit for
manual scram).
RPS segment contributions for the Eagle-21 design
are presented in Figure 6.  In general, the Eagle-21 results
are similar to the results for the Analog Series 7300
design.  However, the Eagle-21 results indicate more
reliable channel signal processing.
Finally, uncertainty results for both RPS designs are
presented in Figure 7.  These uncertainty results
incorporate only data uncertainties.  They do not include
any modeling uncertainties.  Sensitivity studies were
conducted to address certain modeling issues, such as the
failure criterion for RCCA/CRDMs, use of two rather
than three reactor trip signals in the fault tree, and others.
In general, the sensitivity studies indicated that the data
uncertainty results cover most of the modeling
uncertainties.  However, the choice of prior distribution
for the alpha factors in the CCF calculations can
significantly impact the RPS unavailability results.
The Westinghouse RPS unavailabilities obtained
from the 1984 – 1995 data are compared with Individual
Plant Examination (IPE) estimates in Figure 8.  The IPE
RPS estimates range from approximately 1.0E-6 to
RPS Unavailability
RPS Segment No Credit for
Manual Scram
by Operator
Credit for
Manual Scram
by Operator
Train 1.3E-5 (63.0%) 1.3E-7 (2.4%)
Channel 5.1E-6 (23.8%) 2.6E-6 (46.9%)
Trip breaker 1.6E-6 (7.6%) 1.6E-6 (29.1%)
Rod 1.2E-6 (5.6%) 1.2E-6 (21.7%)
Total RPS 2.2E-5 5.4E-6
Figure 5.  Westinghouse RPS unavailability by segment
(Analog Series 7300).
RPS Unavailability
RPS Segment No Credit for
Manual Scram
by Operator
Credit for
Manual Scram
by Operator
Train 1.3E-5 (69.3%) 1.3E-7 (2.9%)
Channel 3.1E-6 (16.1%) 1.6E-6 (34.8%)
Trip breaker 1.6E-6 (8.4%) 1.6E-6 (35.7%)
Rod 1.2E-6 (6.2%) 1.2E-6 (26.6%)
Total RPS 2.0E-5 4.5E-6
Figure 6.  Westinghouse RPS unavailability by segment
(Eagle-21 design).
Unavailability
RPS Design
and Case
5th
Percen-
tile
Median Mean 95th
Percen-
tile
Analog Series
7300 (no
manual scram)
5.8E-6 1.5E-5 2.2E-5 5.7E-5
Analog Series
7300 (manual
scram)
1.3E-6 3.8E-6 5.4E-6 1.4E-5
Eagle-21 (no
manual scram)
4.5E-6 1.3E-5 2.0E-5 5.3E-5
Eagle-21
(manual
scram)
8.8E-7 2.6E-6 4.5E-6 1.2E-5
Figure 7.  Westinghouse RPS uncertainty results.
1.0E-4.  Because of the lack of detailed information in the
IPE submittals, it is not clear which estimates included
credit for operator action.  The uncertainty ranges
obtained in this study cover most of the IPE range of RPS
unavailabilities.  However, most of these other sources
estimated that the trip breaker CCF events would
dominate the RPS unavailability.  In this study, such
events contribute less than 10% when no credit is taken
for manual scram by the operator, and approximately 30%
if credit is taken.
V.  DISCUSSION AND INSIGHTS
CCF events contribute approximately 95% to the
RPS unavailabilities obtained in this study.
Quantification of the CCF events in the RPS fault trees is
a complex process.  The channel and train portions of the
RPS fault tree contain component group sizes ranging
from two to 16, and the rod portion was assumed to have
a representative group size of 50.  A prior for the alpha
factors was developed for the CCF quantification, based
only on Westinghouse RPS component CCFs.  The prior
was then updated using CCF data specific to the
component in question.  In several cases the component-
specific CCF data were sparse, resulting in a strong
influence by the prior.  However, this RPS CCF
quantification is believed to be the most comprehensive
and component-specific effort to date.  The effort would
not have been possible without the methodology outlined
in the report Common-Cause Failure Database and
Analysis System:  Event Definition and Classification.
Several insights were obtained from this study:
1. Both the Analog Series 7300 and Eagle-21 RPS
designs have a single undervoltage driver card in
each of the two trains.  Failure of both of these cards
results in failure of RPS (unless manual scram is
credited).  This CCF event is the dominant
contributor (almost 50%) to RPS unavailability.  In
1989 a CCF event involving both driver cards
occurred while the plant was shut down.  The failures
were caused by maintenance activities and were
detected before the plant returned to power.  Since
then, the driver card design has been changed to
minimize the chance of such maintenance activities
causing such failures.  Also, plant procedures for
such maintenance have been improved.  However,
CCF of both of these cards is still predicted to be a
dominant contributor to RPS unavailability.
2. Issues related to reactor trip breakers, arising during
the early 1980s, are no longer dominant with respect
to RPS unavailability.  (This is true for both cases of
RPS unavailabilities:  without credit for manual
scram and with credit for manual scram.)  Automatic
actuation of the shunt trip mechanism within the
reactor trip breakers and improved maintenance
procedures have resulted in improved performance of
these components.
3. The design of the manual scram feature of the
Westinghouse RPS is especially effective.  If credit is
taken for manual scram by the operator, the predicted
unavailability is reduced by approximately 75%.
This occurs because the manual scram signal
bypasses the train undervoltage driver cards.
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Note:  The ranges shown for the 7300 (Analog Series 7300) and Eagle (Eagle-21) results from this study are the 5th and 95th
percentiles.  All other data points are mean values.
Figure 8.  Westinghouse IPE RPS unavailabilities.
4. The Analog Series 7300 and Eagle-21 RPS designs
have comparable unavailabilities.  This occurs
because the Eagle-21 design considered in this report
involves only the channel-processing portion of the
RPS.  The dominant contributors to RPS
unavailability result from other portions of the RPS.
5. Not many significant Westinghouse RPS CCF events
were identified during the period 1984 – 1995.
Therefore, current practices appear to be effective in
preventing such events.
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